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The two central issues in monetary policy are separated by time
horizon. The first relates to the short run: what is the appropriate mon-
etary policy across the business cycle? The second relates to the long
run: what is the optimal long-run rate of inflation? This paper explores
these classic issues from the vantage point of a small, open economy.
“Smallness” opens up both possibilities and pitfalls for the policymaker,
because several important variables (such as the foreign interest rate,
the real exchange rate, and the worldwide real rate of interest) are now
exogenous from the perspective of the home country.
The short-run focus of monetary policy is to determine how best
to respond to real shocks buffeting the economy. These real shocks
include fiscal disturbances, fluctuations in multifactor productivity,
and movements in real exchange rates. The central banker must
make decisions in real time in the face of severe data problems. In
particular, it is typically unlikely that the central bank can respond
directly to fundamental shocks; instead it must respond to movements
in endogenous variables. For example, the central bank will not im-
mediately observe movements in productivity but instead must re-
spond to movements in the rate of inflation.
These informational restrictions imply that the central bank must
use a fairly simple policy rule, namely, a reaction function linking
movements in the nominal interest rate to these movements in en-
dogenous variables. One such rule is the celebrated Taylor (1993)
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rule. The last several years have seen numerous theoretical analy-
ses of the welfare advantages of different policy rules. Papers include
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995), Ireland (1997), King and Wolman (1996),
and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). These papers posit structural
models of the real economy and the monetary transmission mecha-
nism. A principal conclusion of this line of research is that the wel-
fare gain from operating under the first-best rule rather than the
second- or even the tenth-best rule is small. For example, in a lim-
ited participation model, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995) report that the
welfare gain from switching from a money growth peg (a seemingly
disastrous policy in the posited model) to an interest rate peg (the
second-best policy) equals only 0.017 percent of the steady-state capi-
tal stock. (A limited participation model assumes that only a subset
of the economy directly participates in open market operations, and
thus only this subset has immediate access to the new cash injected
into the economy by the central bank.)
As a consequence of these small welfare numbers, the focus of
recent research has shifted to a related question: how to avoid doing
harm. Relevant papers include Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1997), Kerr
and King (1996), Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (1998), Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1998, 2000, and forthcoming), and Christiano and Gust
(1999). A central bank that follows a rule in which it responds to endog-
enous variables may introduce real indeterminacy and sunspot equi-
libria into an otherwise determinate economy.1 These sunspot
fluctuations are welfare-reducing and potentially quite large. An im-
portant focus of this paper is to isolate the conditions sufficient to
ensure that the monetary policy rule does not introduce sunspot equi-
libria into the economy.
The paper’s analysis is conducted in the context of a fully articu-
lated general-equilibrium model of a small, open economy. The un-
derlying real model is essentially that of Mendoza (1991). Money is
1. There are actually two types of indeterminacy that may arise. The first is
nominal indeterminacy: are the initial values of the price level and all other nomi-
nal variables pinned down? In our notation this corresponds to the question of
whether  Pt/Pt _1 is determined (where t is the initial time period). Nominal
determinacy is a typical occurrence under many interest rate operating procedures,
the most celebrated example being an interest rate peg. It is of no consequence in
and of itself, but rather is important only if it leads to real indeterminacy. By this we
mean a situation in which the behavior of one or more real variables is not pinned
down by the model. This possibility is of great importance as it immediately implies
the existence of sunspot equilibria, which in the present environment are neces-
sarily welfare reducing. Sunspots are purely extraneous variables that alter the
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introduced by assuming that it is required to facilitate certain transac-
tions. The paper considers both a flexible-price economy in which an-
ticipated inflation effects are paramount, and a limited participation
model as in Lucas (1990), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997),
and Fuerst (1992), in which unanticipated money supply shocks have
real effects.2 The “smallness” assumption manifests itself in the as-
sumptions of perfect capital markets an exogenous worldwide real rate
of interest, and an exogenous real exchange rate. From a theoretical
point of view, the “smallness” assumption is particularly attractive,
because many of the results that are obscured in a closed economy are
more readily apparent here. In addition, certain other shocks (such as
to the real exchange rate) are not relevant to a closed economy.
The first two sections of the paper address the issue of real inde-
terminacy in a small, open economy with flexible prices (section 1)
and with limited participation (section 2). A principal conclusion is
that to avoid real indeterminacy the central bank must respond ag-
gressively to past movements in inflation. It is well known that bas-
ing policy responses on market expectations can generate
nonuniqueness of equilibria. For this reason, “looking forward” tends
to create indeterminacy because monetary policy is driven by an en-
dogenous variable that in turn depends on policy.3
A standard argument in the literature is that, to avoid real inde-
terminacy, the central bank must respond aggressively to either ex-
pected inflation (see Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 1997) or current
inflation (see Kerr and King, 1996). These analyses all use reduced-
form, sticky-price models, where the underlying structural model is
a labor-only economy and money is introduced through a money-in-
the-utility function (MIUF) model with a zero cross-partial between
consumption and real balances. In sharp contrast, we argue that a
necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy is for the monetary
authority to react aggressively to past movements in inflation.4
2. Open-economy limited participation models include those of Baier (1997),
Grilli and Roubini (1992), and Schlagenhauff and Wrase (1995).
3. These questions are of more than academic interest. Several central banks
around the world currently use inflation forecasts as an important part of their
decisionmaking on policy issues. The recent federal funds rate increases in the
United States are evidence that such forecasts are used. Although there were few
signs that current inflation was increasing, interest rates were raised at the Au-
gust and November 1999 meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee be-
cause it was feared that higher inflation might well be in the offing.
4. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) demonstrate that these results on indeterminacy
are robust to a closed-economy model with a more elaborate production technology.278 Charles T. Carlstrom and Timothy S. Fuerst
The fundamental differences between our model and the others
just described are twofold. As demonstrated in Carlstrom and Fuerst
(forthcoming), one major difference comes from the assumption about
which money balances enter the utility function. The traditional MIUF
assumption is that it is end-of-period balances that enter. But a direct
extension of a typical cash-in-advance economy suggests that the
money the household has left after leaving the bond market and be-
fore entering the goods market is more appropriate. Remarkably,
this distinction in timing is critical for questions of determinacy. As
argued in Carlstrom and Fuerst (forthcoming), cash-in-advance tim-
ing is a more natural choice, and so we adopt it here. We utilize a
rigid cash-in-advance constraint, but following the arguments of our
earlier paper, the results generalize to an arbitrary MIUF setup with
cash-in-advance timing.
The second major difference is in the type of nominal rigidity
analyzed. The earlier papers assume a sticky price environment
adopted from Calvo (1983). The assumption in that model is that a
fixed fraction of firms adjust their prices every period. This implies
that, for any arbitrarily long but finite period, not all prices will have
adjusted to the levels implied by a flexible-price model. Equivalently,
for arbitrary initial conditions, the deterministic dynamics converge
to the flexible-price steady state only in the infinite limit. This pric-
ing arrangement is problematic for issues of determinacy. For
example, in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1997), an equilibrium is deter-
minate if perturbations from the equilibrium path lead to explosive
inflation dynamics. But surely the Calvo pricing arrangement would
not continue to hold along such a path, so that imposing this arrange-
ment along the path seems quite artificial. In this paper we consider
an alternative nominal rigidity, namely, the limited participation
model mentioned above. But more important, we assume that this
nominal rigidity arises for only a finite and definite time period. That
is, for arbitrary initial conditions, the model converges to the flex-
ible-price steady state within a finite period. This assumption is more
appropriate for the analysis of the limiting behavior that is so impor-
tant for stability analysis.5
The final section of the paper turns to the long-run issue of mon-
etary policy: what is the optimal long-run rate of inflation? By posit-
ing a Taylor rule in sections 1 and 2, we assume that it is not optimal
5. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) demonstrate that these same indeterminacy re-
sults hold for a sticky-price model in which prices are sticky for only a finite time period.279 Optimal Monetary Policy in a Small, Open Economy
for the central bank to follow Friedman’s (1969) advice and engineer
a long-run deflation that will peg the nominal rate of interest to zero.
There is an enormous literature concerning the robustness of
Friedman’s optimum quantity of money result (see, for example,
Woodford, 1990). This paper provides a novel explanation for a posi-
tive long-run rate of inflation that is unique to a small, open economy.
This “smallness” implies that the country takes the foreign nominal
rate of interest as given. To the extent that this foreign rate distorts
domestic behavior, there is a rationale for positive domestic nominal
interest rates.
1. A FLEXIBLE-PRICE MODEL
The economy in the model consists of households, firms, and fi-
nancial intermediaries, with the latter accepting deposits from house-
holds and lending to firms. The firms borrow cash to finance their
wage bill. The households consume a single good that is produced
abroad, and the firms produce a single good that is sold abroad at the
real exchange rate et. The economy is small in that the real exchange
rate is taken as given and households’ foreign asset accumulation
earns a constant real rate of return r.
Households are infinitely lived, with preferences given by
where E0 denotes the expectations operator conditional on time-zero
information,(0,1) is the personal discount factor, ct is consumption
at time t, and Lt is labor supply at time t. To purchase consumption
goods, households are subject to the following cash-in-advance constraint:
where Pt is the price level, Mt denotes beginning-of-period cash bal-
ances, wt denotes the real wage, and Nt denotes the household’s choice
of one-period bank deposits. These deposits earn nominal rate
Rt, which is paid out at the end of the period. The household’s
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Here At denotes the household’s investment in foreign assets that
earn the constant real rate of return r, with (1 + r) = 1. We
assume that asset accumulation occurs at the household level and
that cash in advance is not needed to finance its purchase.de-
notes the profit flow from firms and financial intermediaries.
Firms in this economy produce an export good using a production
function employing domestic labor:
where t is a measure of aggregate productivity, and Ht denotes hired
labor. One can imagine that f is constant returns or that land is an
additional fixed factor in the production function. In the former case
there are no profits to distribute, whereas in the latter case the profit
flow to equity owners is simply the rents on land.  To finance its wage
bill the firm must acquire cash and does so by borrowing short term
from the financial intermediary at (gross) rate Rt.
The intermediary in turn has two sources of cash: cash deposited
by households and new cash injected into the economy by the central
bank. Hence the loan constraint is
where Gt denotes the (gross) money supply growth rate,
Note that monetary injections are carried out as lump-sum transfers to
the financial intermediary.
We restrict our attention to equilibria with strictly positive nomi-
nal interest rates so that the two cash constraints are binding. A
recursive competitive equilibrium is given by stationary decision rules
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The social resource constraint, equation (4), comes from imposing
market clearing and netting out firm and intermediary profits from
the household’s intertemporal budget constraint.
Note that, using equation (3), we can rewrite equation (1) as
The system given by equations (2), (4), and (5) is isomorphic to
Mendoza’s (1991) corresponding real business cycle economy except
that, because of the cash-in-advance constraint, it is distorted by a
consumption tax rate of (1 + tct) = Rt. Because of this implicit con-
sumption tax, the rate of return on foreign assets does not equal the
usual consumption Euler equation, equation (5), and the marginal
rate of substitution is not equal to the marginal product of labor,
equation (2).
This public finance interpretation is key in what follows. For ex-
ample, Carlstrom and Fuerst’s (1995) result that a constant nominal
interest rate is preferred to a variable one is a manifestation of the
standard result that constant taxes are better than fluctuating ones (hold-
ing the mean distortion fixed).6 However, as demonstrated by Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1995) in a calibrated model, these welfare gains are quite
small, and so our attention is shifted to issues of indeterminacy.
Below we consider monetary policy rules in which the nominal rate
(the consumption tax) is endogenous, responding to movements in the
economy. In a real economy, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997) demon-
strate that the endogenous tax rate movements implied by a balanced-
budget rule can lead to real indeterminacy. An important issue below is
whether interest rate operating procedures can have the same effect.
The small-economy assumption makes stability analysis particu-
larly transparent.  Without loss of generality, we now limit the dis-
cussion to the deterministic version of the model. As is well known, if
the deterministic dynamics are not unique, it is possible to construct
sunspot equilibria in the model economy. Substituting equation (3)
into equation (1) yields
6. Such an interest rate smoothing policy is exactly the typical central bank
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As mentioned above, this relationship is not the standard
Fisherian relationship. The above nominal interest rate is the rate
between t + 1 and t + 2, not between t and t + 1. The inflation rate,
however, is between t and t + 1 (t+1  Pt+1/Pt). The reason for this
distortion is that the cash-in-advance constraint is on consumption
but not investment. It is this distortion that gives rise to the poten-
tial for indeterminacy.
Proposition 1: Suppose that monetary policy is given by the for-
ward-looking interest rate rule given by
(7)
where 0 , Rss = ss /, and   [0,1) .
Then, in the flexible-price model, there is real determinacy if and
only if 0   < 1. In any event there is always nominal indeterminacy
as t is free.
Proof:  Since equation (6) starts at t + 1, we scroll equation (7)
ahead one period. Taking the logarithms of equation (7), expressing
R and the s as log deviations, we have
(8)
Exploiting the recursion in equation (8), we have
(9)




For real determinacy we need this mapping to be explosive. Hence
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then t+j is determined for j 1. From equation (7), this pins down Rt+j
for j  0, so that equations (1) through (4) uniquely pin down the
inflation rate and real behavior. Since equation (11) starts with t+1,
the initial price level, t , is free (QED).
An immediate corollary to the above theorem is that an interest
rate peg ( = 0) delivers real determinacy but, like the other rules,
has nominal indeterminacy.
Under the policy rule given by equation (8)—the linearized ver-
sion of equation (7)—the monetary authority responds with an elas-
ticity of  to a geometric weighted average of all future expected
inflation rates, where more weight is placed on the near future. A
special case of such a rule is that where  = 0 and all the weight is
placed on the inflation rate between t and t + 1:
Under this policy rule, increases in expected inflation increase
the nominal rate. But for active policies ( > 1), these nominal rate
increases are also associated with increases in the real rate of inter-
est. Thus we have an implicit consumption tax (the nominal rate)
correlated tightly with expected consumption growth (the real rate).
The self-fulfilling circle goes something like this. An increase in ex-
pected inflation increases investment demand, lowering current con-
sumption. The decline in current consumption increases the real rate
of interest; with  > 1, the nominal rate (consumption tax) rises sharply
with this real rate movement; this tax movement implies that the
initial increase in expected inflation and the decline in current con-
sumption are rational.
The fact that t is free for all values of is just a manifestation of
nominal indeterminacy; that is, there is nothing to pin down the ini-
tial growth rate of money. This innocent remark has some interest-
ing implications.
Proposition 2: Suppose that monetary policy is given by a for-
ward-looking rule that includes the current inflation rate:
(12)
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Then in the flexible-price model there is real indeterminacy for all
values of   0.
Proof:  The proof proceeds as before, leading to the following dif-
ference equation:
Under appropriate conditions this is explosive, so that t+j is pinned
down for j  1. But even in this case t is free and hence so is Rt. Thus
we have real indeterminacy. Once again, if  = 0, we have an interest
rate peg and there is no real indeterminacy (QED).
The nominal indeterminacy from before is now real. Before, t
being free had no real effect, but now, given our interest rate rule, Rt
is free. Since Rt acts like a tax on consumption, the fact that Rt is not
pinned down implies that real behavior is indeterminate. The reason
for this indeterminacy is that our policy rule is responding to endog-
enous variables. This is why an interest rate peg ( = 0) is determinate.
This discussion suggests that the central bank should look fur-
ther backward so that it only responds to exogenous variables. Re-
markably, by looking backward the conditions for determinacy are
(almost) entirely flipped on their head from when the Taylor rule is
forward looking.
Proposition 3: Suppose that monetary policy is given by the back-
ward-looking interest rate rule given by
(13)
where   0 , Rss = ss /, and  [0,1) .
Then in the flexible-price model there is real determinacy if and only
if  = 0 or  > 1.  In the case of  > 1, there is also nominal determinacy.
Proof:  Following the strategy pursued in proposition 1, we are
led to the following difference equation:
For real determinacy we thus need  > 1, which then implies that
t+j is pinned down for j  0 (QED).
 
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An interest rate peg is determinate but, like before, has nominal
indeterminacy. Notice, however, that if the monetary authority re-
sponds aggressively to past inflations ( > 1), initial inflation and hence
the initial money stock are pinned down. This result is a general-
equilibrium generalization of McCallum’s (1981) earlier result.
McCallum argued that because an interest rate peg suffered from
nominal indeterminacy, the monetary authority needed a nominal
anchor, which could be accomplished by responding to a nominal vari-
able. Proposition 3 confirms this but shows that merely responding
to a nominal variable, like past inflation, is not enough. The mon-
etary authority has to aggressively respond to past inflation to en-
sure nominal determinacy.
For completeness, we consider a backward-looking rule in which
the central bank also considers the current inflation rate:
Proposition 4: Suppose that monetary policy is given by a back-
ward-looking interest rate rule that also includes the current infla-
tion rate:
(14)
where  0 , Rss = ss /, and  [0,1) .
Then in the flexible-price model there is real determinacy if and only
if  = 0 or 1 <  <  (1 + )/(1 _ ). In the case of 1 <  <  (1 + )/(1 _ ),
there is also nominal determinacy.
Proof:  Following the strategy pursued in proposition 3, we are
led to the following difference equation:
For determinacy, the term in brackets must be outside the unit
circle. There are two regions to consider. First, if (1 _ ) < 1, the brack-
eted term exceeds unity whenever  > 1. If (1 _ ) > 1, we must consider
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Combining the two regions, we have the region noted in the propo-
sition (QED).
With an active policy, looking backward can render the economy
determinate. Yet the more weight is placed on the distant past (the
larger is ), the more the bounds for determinacy shrink.
Although at this stage nominal indeterminacy is merely a nui-
sance, its presence becomes critical in the next section when we con-
sider how the presence of a particular type of nominal rigidity, namely,
sluggish portfolios, affects the above results.
2. A LIMITED PARTICIPATION MODEL
A natural criticism of the previous analysis is that it was con-
ducted in a monetary model in which only anticipated inflation has
real effects. For example, under most of the policies considered there
is nominal indeterminacy in the flexible-price model, implying that
an independently and identically distributed shock to the money sup-
ply has no effect on any real variables.7 This section extends the
analysis to a more compelling model of monetary nonneutrality in
which iid shocks have real effects.
The model we choose to examine is the limited participation model
(see, for example, Lucas, 1990, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans,
1996, and Fuerst, 1992). There are at least two reasons for this choice.
First, in contrast to sticky-price models, there has been very little
work on indeterminacy issues in this type of model.8 Second, there is
a compelling empirical reason to consider such a model. A well-known
empirical phenomenon is that, in response to a positive monetary
policy innovation (a movement downward in the nominal interest rate),
aggregate real behavior displays a hump-shaped time profile, while
prices rise slowly to a higher level. A hump-shaped consumption
7. This exception is a backward-looking Taylor rule when  > 1. Otherwise the
fact that initial money growth is free implies that iid shocks to money growth will
also achieve the interest rate directive.
8. A notable exception is Christiano and Gust (1999). There are two important
differences between their analysis and the model presented here. First, they
assume that investment purchases are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint,
whereas this paper makes the more standard assumption that investment is a
credit good. Second, in their model the portfolio rigidity is forever rigid in that the
deterministic dynamics converge to the flexible-price model only in the limit. This
is analogous to a Calvo (1983) pricing arrangement.287 Optimal Monetary Policy in a Small, Open Economy
profile implies an increase in the real rate of interest, whereas an
upward movement in prices implies that expected inflation cannot
fall. But then we are left with a puzzle: how can nominal interest
rates fall? The obvious answer is that over some time horizon the
standard Fisherian interest rate determination is broken; that is,
equation (3) must not hold over some time interval.
This is exactly the assumption made in limited participation models.
In particular, these models assume that the (nominal) portfolio choice
(Nt) is made one period in advance, so that equation (3) is replaced with
The positive implications of these models are well-known. For ex-
ample, suppose that
Then straightforward calculations imply
With Nt predetermined, this implies that monetary shocks in-
crease employment and domestic output, while driving down the do-
mestic nominal interest rate. From a policy perspective, the more
important observation is that employment does not respond to pro-
ductivity or real exchange rate shocks, because these shocks drive
the nominal interest rate upward. This sluggishness makes a clear
case for monetary policy: money growth should be varied to accom-
modate these shocks. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995) use this as a start-
ing point to make the case for interest rate pegging in this model.
Once again, the welfare gains are small.
Because of this we turn to stability analysis. The attractive
feature of the limited participation model is that it breaks the
rigid Fisherian interest rate determination. But for the stability
properties of interest rate operating procedures, this turns out
to be somewhat disastrous since the interest rate is no longer
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As before, we need only consider the deterministic dynamics. After
one period, portfolios can adjust, implying that for stability analysis we
must replace equation (3) with its counterpart scrolled forward:
Combining this with the asset accumulation equation (1), we have
(16)
(17)
For stability analysis, the system of equations includes equations (16)
and (17), the labor equation (2), and the resource constraint equation (4).
Equation (16) is familiar from before. Under suitable conditions
on the interest rate operating procedure it will pin down inflation
and interest rate dynamics. The novelty is in equation (17): the lim-
ited participation constraint implies that there is little to pin down
the initial Uct and thus the initial asset accumulation decision, even
if the initial nominal interest rate is determined.
To have any hope of determinacy we need an extra restriction.
The limited participation constraint provides one: Nt is a predeter-
mined nominal variable. Combining the two binding cash constraints,
and using the household’s labor choice decision, we have
(18)
Since Mt and Nt are predetermined, this provides an additional restric-
tion; in the flexible price model Nt is free and equation (18) does not re-
strict real behavior. In particular, if a policy rule pins down the current
price level Pt , then the additional restriction in equation (18) will pin down
the initial consumption-asset-accumulation decision. Hence the only way
of achieving determinacy is if the interest rate operating procedure pins
down the current t  Pt /Pt _1. This immediately implies the following:
Proposition 5: Suppose that monetary policy is given by either a
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Taylor rule as in equation (12). Then in the limited participation model
there is real indeterminacy for all values of .
It also implies its corollary:
Proposition 6: Suppose that monetary policy is given by a back-
ward-looking Taylor rule as in equation (13). Then in the limited
participation model there is real determinacy if and only if  > 1.
Suppose that monetary policy is given by the current/backward-
looking Taylor rule given in equation (14). Then there is real
determinacy if and only if 1 <  <  (1 + )/(1 _ ).
Notice that a forward-looking Taylor rule and an interest rate
peg both suffer from real indeterminacy, because both had nomi-
nal indeterminacy in the corresponding flexible-price economy.9
An active backward-looking Taylor rule, however, pins down the
price level. Since portfolios are predetermined in nominal terms,
this price-level determination pins down an extra real variable.
3. A FLEXIBLE-PRICE MODEL WITH TWO CURRENCIES
This section changes the nature of the analysis from the short run
(policy across the business cycle) to the long run (the long-run rate of
inflation). Given this focus, we ignore dynamic issues and instead con-
centrate on steady-state analysis.
In terms of modeling, this section builds on the earlier model by
assuming that the home-country agent has preferences over both the
imported and the exported good and that the imported good must be
paid for with foreign currency accumulated in advance.10 Hence we
have a model with two cash constraints and thus two implicit con-
sumption taxes. The imported good is taxed at the foreign interest
rate, whereas the domestically produced good is taxed at the domestic
interest rate. In section 1, domestic currency could be used for all
transactions, so that there was only one implicit tax—the domestic
interest rate. But now there are two taxes, one of which the domestic
central bank takes as exogenous. In this environment it may not be
optimal for the home country to follow Friedman’s dictum and drive
the domestic nominal interest rate to zero.
9. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995) show that an interest rate peg suffers from
real indeterminacy in a closed-economy limited participation model.
10. This more complicated modeling environment would not affect the earlier
conditions for real determinacy.290 Charles T. Carlstrom and Timothy S. Fuerst
Household preferences over the imported good (good 2), the do-
mestically produced good (good 1), and work effort are given by
(19)
To finance its consumption purchases, the household uses




where Mit denotes holdings of the home (i = 1) and the foreign (i = 2)
currency; Pit denotes the nominal price of goods i = 1, 2; Wt denotes
the nominal wage expressed in home currency; and Nit denotes bank
deposits denominated in the two currencies i = 1, 2. The intertemporal
constraint (expressed in home currency) is thus given by
where Rit denotes the nominal interest rate denominated in the two
currencies i = 1, 2; st is the end-of-period nominal exchange rate;
and Xt is a currency transfer from the foreign government. Since
this is a small, open economy, we need to exogenously impose an
equilibrium condition on domestically owned bank deposits of for-
eign currency. For simplicity we assume that these are in zero net
supply, so that one equilibrium condition imposed below will be N2t
= 0. Similarly, since our focus is on steady-state issues, we abstract
from real foreign asset accumulation (At). This is done without loss
of generality.
The first-order conditions to the household’s problem include
(22)
(23)
As for the firm, it produces good 1 using the production tech-
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currency to finance its wage bill. In addition, it imports good 2 at
exogenous terms of trade. (As before, the imported good is the
numeraire, so that et is the real price of good 1 in terms of good 2.)
The firm then sells the two goods at their respective prices Pit.
Since the firm does not distribute dividends until the end of the
period, it maximizes its end-of-period profits. Hence purchasing
power parity is in terms of the end-of-period exchange rate:
(24)
Interest rate parity is given by
where     is the beginning-of-period, or spot, exchange rate. The fact
that equation (24) does not hold with the spot exchange rate, but
instead with the end-of-period exchange rate, is a manifestation of
the cash-in-advance distortion.
Substituting the firm’s optimization conditions into the house-
hold first-order conditions yields
As noted earlier, this is now a model with two implicit consump-
tion taxes, both of which are manifested in equations (25) and (26).
The home-produced good (good 1) is taxed at the domestic nominal
rate, whereas the imported good (good 2) is taxed at the foreign rate
of interest. For a given foreign interest rate it is clear that the cen-
tral bank faces a second-best problem. Setting the domestic rate to
match the foreign rate may alleviate one distortion, equation (26),
but exacerbates another, equation (25).
The social resource constraint comes from imposing the equilib-
rium decision rules and market-clearing conditions on the household’s
intertemporal constraint. As previously, we assume that only domes-
tic households hold domestic currency. Hence we need only adjust














































(26)292 Charles T. Carlstrom and Timothy S. Fuerst
(27)
where        denotes foreign cash balances per capita held by the
representative domestic household (in the earlier model, domestic
households held no foreign cash).
In the steady state, domestic labor supply and purchases of the two
goods are constant. Since we are uninterested in the wealth effects
coming from exogenous foreign price movements, we assume that
(28)
where c2 is the steady-state level of the imported good.11 The house-
hold takes this transfer as exogenous so that it does not affect mar-
ginal decisionmaking but is only felt at the aggregate resource level.
In particular, with the transfer given by equation (28), the binding
cash-in-advance constraint implies that foreign money holdings drop
out of the resource constraint, so that the steady-state resource con-
straint is given by
(29)
The steady-state welfare problem is to maximize equation (19) sub-
ject to equations (25), (26), and (29).
We must utilize numerical methods to make any headway. Hence
assume the following functional forms:
For our benchmark calibration, we set to 1 both the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (1/) and the elasticity of substitution between
the two consumption goods (1/	); we set the labor supply elasticity
(1/
) to 0.333 and the labor share to  = 2/3.  We also normalize  = 1,


















2 1 2 f     
  ,
  , 2 2 1 2 c P P X t t t   
11. Thus this assumption is in the spirit of Lucas (1982), who assumes that
domestic and foreign households are insured against “seigniorage risk.” Without
this assumption the analysis would proceed with an inflation tax term in the
aggregate resource constraint in equation (29).
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The foreign interest rate is set at R2 = 1.06. We then choose  so that,
with R1 = 1.06, we have L = 1/3.
Figures 1 through 3 present the results for differing values of
the elasticity of substitution between differing values of the labor
supply elasticity (1/
), the two consumption goods (1/	), and dif-
fering import shares (variations in ). Across all three figures all
other parameters are held constant except the one being analyzed.












Figure 2. Optimal Interest Rate and Elasticity of Substitution
Between c1 and c2 (1/)
Optimal interest rate
Elasticity of substitution
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The figures reveal standard second-best intuition. When there are
two distorted margins, the benevolent planner will choose to more heavily
distort the margin that is less elastic or less important. The two mar-
gins here are the labor-leisure choice in equation (25) and the choice
between good 1 and good 2 in equation (26). The first distortion is elimi-
nated with a zero nominal rate (a gross rate of unity), and the second is
eliminated by matching the foreign interest rate.
Figures 1 through 3 have the qualitative shape that one would
expect. As 1/	 goes to zero and demands become highly inelastic, the
distortionary impact of divergent nominal interest rates declines.
Hence the optimal response is to lower the distortion on the labor
margin by lowering the domestic interest rate. As labor supply be-
comes highly inelastic and 1/
 goes to zero, just the opposite is true,
and the optimal response is to more closely match the foreign rate.
Figure 3 reveals that as the importance of the foreign sector rises,
the cost of this distortion rises. Hence as the foreign share rises, the
optimal response is to move closer to the foreign rate. Notice that,
except under extreme parameter values, the optimal domestic rate is
significantly different from Friedman’s zero.
Before closing, it is instructive to compare this steady-state analy-
sis with the corresponding dynamic Ramsey problem (see, for example,
Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe, 1996). In the present context the key
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issue is the form of the aggregate resource constraint. For the house-
hold budget constraint to collapse into the form given by equation
(29), one needs to preclude an initial and one-time flight from the
foreign currency (a possibility that, by assumption, cannot arise in a
steady-state analysis). That is, if the Ramsey planner began with
the level of foreign cash balances given by the steady-state problem,
he would encourage a one-time drop in these currency holdings by
setting the domestic nominal rate to zero. This lower domestic rate
would lead the household to decrease its consumption of foreign
goods and thus lower its holdings of foreign currency. For all future
periods this flight would leave the domestic household at a period-
by-period utility level lower than that under the steady-state prob-
lem (as consumption of the imported good would be forever lower).
To rule out this type of behavior, we must replace equation (28)
with the stronger condition
(30)
This transfer scheme imposes an implicit tax on currency flight.
Once again the domestic household takes this transfer as exogenous,
and thus it does not enter private marginal conditions. However, the
Ramsey planner is affected by these transfers, and they lead to an
aggregate resource constraint like that in equation (29). Hence, un-
der the assumption made in equation (30), the steady-state analysis
and the dynamic Ramsey problem are equivalent.
4. CONCLUSION
This paper has used a standard open-economy model to address
two classic questions in monetary policy: What is the appropriate
monetary policy across the business cycle? And what is the optimal
long-run rate of inflation?
Recent research suggests that an important issue for the first
question is what policy restrictions ensure that the central bank’s
policy rule does not introduce real indeterminacy and sunspot fluctua-
tions into an otherwise stable economy. The message is clear: the cen-
tral bank should respond aggressively to lagged inflation rates. From
the standpoint of indeterminacy issues, a policy that targets current and
future expected inflation is disastrous. Responding “passively” to only
future expected inflation or targeting the nominal interest rate may
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avoid real indeterminacy in a flexible-price model. However, these
policies are disastrous when the economy is subject to a nominal
rigidity such as that implied by limited participation. In terms of
exchange rates, to the extent that a pegged exchange rate implies
that the domestic nominal interest rate is given exogenously by
the foreign country, a pegged exchange rate is also subject to real
indeterminacy and sunspot fluctuations.
As for the second question, concerning the long-run rate of infla-
tion, a small, open economy faces an exogenous foreign interest rate.
Almost certainly this rate distorts domestic behavior. Hence the cen-
tral bank immediately faces a second-best problem. One distortion (a
positive foreign rate) can be worse than two (a positive domestic and
foreign interest rate). This is a novel reason to stay clear of Friedman’s
zero nominal rate.
This paper’s general-equilibrium or structural approach to policy
evaluation has many advantages, including an obvious welfare crite-
rion (lifetime utility of the typical agent) and a clear articulation of
what parameters are invariant to policy. General-equilibrium analy-
sis forces one to be specific, and as always the devil is in the details.
An example illustrates this point. King and Wolman (1996) analyze a
sticky-price general-equilibrium model and conclude that strict price-
level targeting is the optimal monetary policy. In contrast, the re-
sults of Carlstrom and Fuerst (forthcoming) imply that a plausible
alteration in their modeling of money demand implies that an ag-
gressive price-level target is actually destabilizing and introduces
sunspot equilibria into the economy. Which conclusion is correct?
One must examine the details, all of which a simple reduced-form
model obscures.297 Optimal Monetary Policy in a Small, Open Economy
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